Thus spoke Major Milo Minderbinder in 1943.
Was he right? Does contracting out combat support functions save money? I mean, that is not quite the whole feud, but it is some of it.
The best answer comes from study published by John McGrath, at Fort Leavenworth. Below are the figures from Table B-2 for various American wars. The figures apply only to the Army but rightfully include staging areas in Korea and both Gulf Wars: Japan and Kuwait, respectively.
So what do we got? At first glance, success! A higher tooth-to-tail ratio, awesome sauce!
We are back to the levels of World War 2! (AEF = American Expeditionary Force of WW1; ETO = European Theater of Operations in WW2.) Hooah!
Only, well, that does not include the contractors. We really should put them back into the mix, since they did jobs that soldiers did in Gulf 1 and before.
Ah. Well. Not so good.
Now, to be fair, these figures do not include the extensive host-country support the U.S. received in Korea, which would make that war look pretty bad. (Korea would fall to 28% combat troops on a BOTE calculation.)
They also do not include potential cost savings. After all, if private contractors are cheaper, then you would expect that the military would use more of them. Calculating that, however, is incredibly complex, because American operations have become far more capital and resource-intense over time. The simple calculations show ever-rising real deployment costs, but that could be a reflection of the fact that the American soldier in Gulf 2 was rather more lethal (and well protected) than the American soldier of Gulf 1, who was both more lethal and better protected (and better fed) than the American soldier in Vietnam, who was more lethal than the American soldiers who beat Hitler.
It is hard to figure.
But the headline figures should induce skepticism.
This, note, is just for outsourcing support functions; we have not gotten into questions of outsourcing actual genuine combat. You know, what Major Minderbinder really wanted to see. That is an even less-satisfying topic for another post.
But in Iraq it's my opinion that the existing combat service support structures could have supported twice as many warfighters as they did. No matter how few convoys are running, the sustainment headquarters are about the same size.
Posted by: JKR | July 13, 2017 at 07:25 AM
Interesting!
One implication of your assumption is that HQ units made large efficiency gains between 1990 and 2005. They fell by somewhere between four and ten percentage points between Gulf One and Gulf Two, even though Gulf Two mobilized fewer soldiers. (The 369th CSB HQ certainly didn't seem very efficient, but I have no basis for comparison.)
Is that conclusion reasonable?
Posted by: Noel Maurer | July 13, 2017 at 09:39 AM
I should add that the Germany comparisons might not be entirely fair; American HQ elements would have been responsible for non-American NATO units in the event of war.
Posted by: Noel Maurer | July 13, 2017 at 11:48 AM