It has been more than three weeks since the Minsk II ceasefire was supposed to go into effect.* The agreement was supposed to create a 100 km wide corridor where no heavy weapons — artillery, tanks, etcetera — would be allowed. The corridor ran from the Russian border through Lugansk all the way along the long of contact down to the Black Sea. The OSCE is supposed to to verify the ceasefire.
Most artillery has been pulled back and fighting along the line of contact has ceased, other than small sporadic clashes along the line. There are, however, two notable exceptions.
The first is the city of Donetsk. Fighting continues, albeit at a lower level than before. Both sides have used tanks and artillery despite the ostensible pullback. In theory, Donetsk is the primary prize in the fighting. In practice, it’s a distraction. The Ukrainians are trying to keep the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and the Russians tied down, since the Russians know that the town could fall if they shift forces elsewhere. Meanwhile, the Russians want to keep the Ukrainians tied up in the north should they decide to focus elsewhere. (Spoiler alert: the Russians want to focus elsewhere.) The result is a relatively intense level of conflict about which neither side is serious.
Which brings us to the other, more serious fight: Shyrokyne, on the road to Mariupol. The squicky Azov Battalion and Ukrainian army has been trying to hold back the DNR and Russians. The road to Mariupol has seen battles back and forth since January, some involving heavy weapons. Right now, the fighting could best be characterized as probing or scouting. However, that is probably about to change.
After capturing Debaltseve and taking a moment to organize, the DNR and the Russians are massing in the south, near Novoazovsk. Their intent appears to be to push on to Mariupol and possibly beyond. But why?
The somewhat infamous Stratfor wargamed out Russia’s different military options in Ukraine. Their point was not to state what Russia would do, but rather examne what it could do and at what cost. They laid out three different goals. In the first, the Russians try to carve out a land bridge to Crimea. In the second, they try to take all of southern Ukraine to the Romanian border, including Odessa. In the third, they occupy eastern Ukraine to the river Dniepr.
Right now the DNR is getting ready for scenario 1. The question is whether they will move before the rains stop. It’s pretty crappy between now and mid May as Ukraine gets all the rain that California wishes it had. The rain turns everything into sticky mud. This gets overplayed a lot by wargamers and whatnot, because of WW2, but it does favor the defender. That said, the muck can be overcome. The real reason that the Russians probably want to wait is to let Ukraine melt down a little more economically. It isn’t that Ukraine’s economic slide will materially affect its ability to mobilize men and machines. It is that it will help show that the West isn’t interested in helping. Hearts and minds: fscking Poroshenko! damn America! Left us to rot! Russia /has/ to be better than this.
Unless the DNR et al is really lucky, the land bridge scenario will be where they stop. Crossing the Dnieper is not trivial. The DNR would need to capture bridges and bring up engineering battalions — the retreating Ukrainians would pound with artillery the bridges they didn’t blow. This is, of course, assuming the Russians do not overtly intervene. Odessa has a “place in their hearts” too.
Why would Putin want to let the separatists push south? For one, Crimea has been suffering. By taking the land bridge, Russia would gain control of the utilities. Additionally, supplying day-to-day necessities becomes a lot easier: right now, food must come across the Kerch Straits. A bridge is years away.
But more importantly, I don’t think Putin currently wants a frozen conflict. I think his ideal goal is to sheer off the South and East to add to Crimea and leave the rest: it’ll make for a convenient dumping ground for those who oppose Russian rule and a buffer zone which the Europeans will never let into NATO or the E.U. Even without the east, he’ll have secured that goal by taking the land bridge. It would take a much more rigorous response, stronger sanctions and more military aid for Ukraine, to stop him.
Putin is boiling a frog here: ever increasing the heat and seeing if Europe hops out. So far, the rate of the rising temperature has not made the Europeans willing to leave the sauce pan.
A quick recap of the ceasefire agreement status.
On elements 1 and 2 see the body of the post above.
Element #3: The OSCE will check the ceasefire and heavy weaponry withdrawal from day one, and can use satellites and drones.
The OSCE has been told by the rebels that they will not be allowed to check the borders. They have been obstructed multiple times by both side although in several cases the Ukrainian higher ups cleared the way. The rebels have several areas along the border which they have steered the OSCE away from.
Elements 4 and 5 were not implemented.
Element #6: Release and exchange all hostages and illegally detained prisoners on an “all-for-all” basis, starting five days after withdrawal of heavy weapons.
I cannot tell if the Ukrainian military has handed over all of its captured soldiers. I can tell that the DNR has not done so: they recently had captured Ukrainians collecting and cleaning up bodies at the Donetsk Airport after the exchange at Debaltseve.
It should also be noted foreign troops were supposed to be pulled out of Ukraine. This has not happened. In fact, NATO pins the number of Russian regular army soldiers in the Donbas as being 12,000. That’s an increase from a couple months ago.
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