There have been suggestions that Crimea’s dependence on gas and electricity from the mainland makes it uniquely vulnerable to a Ukrainian blockade.
Well, no. It does not. The Russian military presence itself does not depend on imported anything from Ukraine.
The civilian population does depend on imports from over the border, but inflicting hardship on them would be guaranteed to increase support for Russia by a multiple. Morale in Crimea (and the Russian Federation) would go through the roof. Wartime conditions have that effect on people.
Meanwhile the Russians would be shipping in supplies to keep the Crimeans from freezing or starving, at some cost but a bearable one ... and any Ukrainian attack on those shipments would provide a perfect casus belli and deprive Kiev of the moral high ground internationally.
Consider the evidence in Bombing to Win, by Robert Pape of the University of Chicago. Strategic bombing universally failed to demoralize populations. Why would a strategic blockade succeed?
If you doubt that, consider what happened in 1948. When the Soviets blockaded Berlin, the Berliners were not demoralized and the Western Allies did not roll over. Nor did the Soviets attack the supply aircraft, despite being in a much better position to do so than the Ukrainians would be today.
An attempt to blockade Crimea would be 1948 in reverse. It would be stupid. All indications are that the people in Kiev realize that. That is why (I hope!) it will not happen.
I'm very sleepy right now, but I think the grip of the article is wrong. What the article *desires* is to reclaim the sense of initiative, hence, the morale being boosted is on the part of the Ukrainians, and not suppressing the morale of the Russians.
In general, in the modern post WWII era, isn't the point of most of these things, blockades, bombings (particularly stuff like Operation Menu), pretty much about demonstrating that you're the boss to the exclusion (and maybe willfully and perversely profitably so) of actual military or geopolitical aims?
Get mad at someone, toss a cruise missile at 'em, feel better. Whether the other guy feels bad or good is entirely besides the point.
Posted by: shah8 | March 16, 2014 at 02:23 AM
Have you read Baldoli and Knapp's work on France and Italy? shorter: strategic bombing (along with lots of other things, but sometimes on its own) did work on Italy.
Posted by: Chris williams | March 22, 2014 at 08:17 AM
"In general, in the modern post WWII era, isn't the point of most of these things, blockades, bombings (particularly stuff like Operation Menu), pretty much about demonstrating that you're the boss to the exclusion (and maybe willfully and perversely profitably so) of actual military or geopolitical aims?
"Get mad at someone, toss a cruise missile at 'em, feel better. Whether the other guy feels bad or good is entirely besides the point."
Couple months ago, I spent several posts trying to say something like this. Shah8 just nailed it in two 'graphs.
Posted by: David Allen | March 22, 2014 at 09:55 AM
Hi, Chris! I have not: I am going to now.
It strikes me that the relevant literature is on blockades, not strategic bombing. And for that the go-to work is Naval Blockades in Peace and War, by Lance Davis and Stan Engerman. It's sitting on my shelf at home: I'm going to read it and probably write a blog post as soon as I get back to Boston.
David, I think you're extrapolating too much from a relatively small number of examples, most of which date from the Clinton Administration. (And the '86 raid on Libya.) I can't disagree with you that punitive raids happen. I can't disagree that they're generally pointless either --- although not always; the recent Colombian raid on FARC sanctuaries in Ecuador appears to have accomplished its strategic aims.
For the readers: Operation Menu was the Nixon Administration's secret bombing of Cambodia. It was intended as operational interdiction of NLF staging areas in neutral territory. It did not accomplish its aims but the fact that neither side publicized the operation is not consistent with the idea that the goals were anything other than operational.
Shah8, I like you, but you owe an apology for an intemperate comment on another post.
Posted by: Noel Maurer | March 23, 2014 at 01:06 AM