The Correlation of Forces

 Doug Muir here.

Back in the day, the Soviet Union used to have a concept called “the correlation of forces.” Briefly, this was a metric made up of everything that determined relative power: military might, economic power, public opinion, internal divisions, political allegiance, and diplomatic relations.

I say “a metric,” but that’s a bit misleading. One reason the whole “correlation of forces” thing never quite caught on outside the USSR and its satellites was because it wasn’t a metric; you couldn’t easily break it down into a number or a set of easily manipulated facts. You could count tanks, planes and men with guns and produce cool-looking charts to (a) define and measure a threat, and/or (b) ask for a budget increase. But the correlation of forces couldn’t be quantified so easily. So it remained, in Western eyes, a bit airy-fairy; and after the fall of the USSR, it got more or less left by the wayside. (Here’s how far the phrase has fallen: it does not have a wikipedia page.)

That’s a pity, because it’s a useful concept. Consider, for instance, the current conflict in Libya. In military terms, Qaddafi should be doing okay. He’s still in charge of most of Libya’s territory, including its capital, and most of its population. He’s still got a much bigger army than the rebels. He has open supply lines through friendly neutral countries (Algeria, Chad) — which means that, although he’s formally under embargo, he can almost certainly import weapons, men, ammunition, replacement parts, and pretty much anything else he needs.

But he’s not doing okay. He’s losing. This is a war on three fronts — the east, the western mountains, and Misurata in between — and he’s been losing ground on all of them. Generals and ministers have been defecting. Foreign countries have been lining up to recognize the rebels. In Soviet terms, the correlation of forces has shifted against him — and is, at this writing, continuing to do so.

One way in which the correlation of forces is useful is that it illuminates positive feedback loops in a way that simple gun-counting doesn’t. If we have a battle, and I win, there’s not necessarily a positive feedback for me beyond whatever I gain from winning the battle itself. In other words, just beating Lee at Gettysburg, by itself, doesn’t help your cause very much. Sure, you’ve killed x number of men (tanks, planes) and presumably gained a better position on the board. But unless you’ve wiped out a major chunk of the enemy’s forces, decapitated his leadership, or laid his homeland open to invasion and devastation, you haven’t actually done much.

But if you think in correlation-of-forces terms — ah, that’s different. A lost battle can lead to bad economic consequences (the Confederate currency crashed after Gettysburg, and never recovered). It can lead to bad diplomatic consequences, to the surfacing of internal divisions, to the collapse of internal morale or the defection of unreliable minor allies. And these secondary effects can, themselves, affect the military balance of forces. In fact, a lost battle may itself be the result of economic or diplomatic problems — and may then cause more problems, which can lead to losing more battles.

I’m oversimplifying, of course. But it does provide a useful way of looking at what’s happening in Libya. Qaddafi is losing ground for a variety of reasons. His military is a bunch of unhappy draftees; morale is low. (Civilian morale is no better.) NATO is preventing him from using his air, armor, or heavy artillery, while also degrading his 4C. He has every reason to be paranoid about a coup, which means he must restrict power and personal interaction to a small trusted circle, which cuts down on his (already degraded) ability to process information and respond effectively.

Here’s my take on this: things are likely to get worse for him, because the more ground he loses, the more likely he is to lose more ground. He’s probably still able to launch counterattacks at the tactical level, so he may well be able to roll back the rebels in one or more areas. But he won’t easily be able to build on those victories, because they won’t change the underlying diplomatic, economic, or internal-political dynamics. To accomplish that, he’d have to win a major, crushing victory — retake Misurata, say, or wipe the Berbers off the map. That’s unlikely to happen. Meanwhile, rebel victories in the field do change the correlation of forces — they further depress Loyalist morale, make Qaddafi’s remaining foreign allies less enthusiastic about standing up for him, make major desertions more likely, and thus make Qaddafi ever more paranoid and isolated. Simply put, he’s trying to climb a slope that’s steadily getting steeper.
 
Back in April, I said I gave Qaddafi “more than a month, but less than a year.” I’ll narrow that a little now — as of this posting, he’s got more than two weeks, but less than six months. Too vague? Okay, I’ll live dangerously: August, plus or minus a month. If you disagree, feel free to make your own predictions in the comments.

Comments

[Doug M.]

Correlation of forces, last 24 hours: NTC has sold their first tankerload of oil. Foreign donors have pledged a total of $1.3 billion in nonmilitary aid to the rebels. A boatload of defectors, allegedly including field-grade military officers, has arrived in Tunisia.

A large (500 men + personnel carriers + artillery) Loyalist attack took place near Misurata; rebels are claiming victory with ~70 casualties. Qaddafi claims to have shot down a NATO helicopter. (Which IMO is perfectly plausible, esp. if they're doing close support. But it won't help much.)

This last may be random, or someone on Qaddafi's side may be thinking clearly. The foolish strategy would be to stomp the Berbers, who've been making serious gains down south and are now just over 100 km from Tripoli. But the Berbers, though annoying, aren't a strategic threat -- there aren't enough of them, and they don't have heavy enough weapons, to seriously threaten Tripoli. Hammering at Misurata makes more sense, even if it's not likely to succeed.

Doug M.

[Noel Maurer]

Qatar has has shipped four tankers full of gasoline, diesel and other refined fuels to Benghazi, enough to feed the Benghazi power plant for one or two weeks. More shipments are coming (outside the aid pledge): they aren't covered by commercial tracking services.

In other news, it looks like the Italian decision to take the lead on arranging western aid is paying off.

[Will Baird]

There seem to be reports of rebels at or near http://maps.google.com/maps?f=q&source=s_q&hl=en&geocode=&q=ZAWIYAH+,+Libya&aq=&sll=32.012734,12.897949&sspn=4.140148,5.592041&ie=UTF8&hq=&hnear=Az-Z%C4%81wiyah,+Az+Zawiyah,+Libya&ll=32.049989,12.908936&spn=4.138466,5.592041&z=8>Zawiyah.

[Doug M.]

Guerrillas != a fourth front -- though it's certainly interesting.

Doug M.

[Will Baird]

I saw a report this morning that the rebels are starting to move west to Zlilan. Is Misrata actually under their control now?

[Doug M.]

Yah, they seem to have driven the Loyalists well west of the city center.

In fact, of the three fronts, the only one that's still static is the main one in the east.

Doug M.

[Will Baird]

And the US recognizes the NTC as the legitimate Libyan gov.

[Will Baird]

The NTC just dissolved their executive committee after that military leader assassination. Is this as bad as it appears?

[Doug M.]

It's pretty bad, yes.

The funny thing is, the further one gets from Benghazi, the better the rebels' military situation seems to become.

Doug M.

[Doug M.]

Major breakthroughs in the last few days on every front but in the east, where the advances have been slow and modest.

Probably time for another post.

Doug M.

[Will Baird]

Gaddafi is lobbing scuds now. That says desperation to me.

[Doug M.]

He has reason to be desperate. The latest offensive seems to have caught him badly by surprise.

Note that the Scud was launched not in the west, where the rebels are drawing the noose around Tripoli, but in the east. Why? Well, Scuds are not precision weapons, at all. My guess is that it's an implicit threat at the oil infrastructure -- "even if you manage to take it intact, we can still trash it from a distance". Trashing the oil industry and/or the capital are pretty much his last strong bargaining chips now.

Doug M.

[Will Baird]

If the oil infrastructure is all on the coast, think an aegis might be deployed in the area soon?

Is it me, or did it seem that the rebels stopped the see-sawing after the French and British deployed the attack helicopters?

[Doug M.]

It's not all on the coast, but that's where the refineries and jetties are.

There's already at least one Aegis in theater. Also, note that Qaddafi's Scud capacity is probably pretty limited. And he doesn't have a lot of room to move his launch sites around any more. He's now hemmed into the triangle Zawiya - Zlitan - Bani Walid, which is an area maybe the size of New Jersey, with no point more than 100 miles inland. So any launch site is likely to attract a lot of negative attention pretty quickly. I don't see the Scuds playing more than a minor role.

The helicopters are definitely helping. What's interesting is that they seem to be coordinating effectively with rebel forces tactically right down to the platoon level. In the last month or so, somebody's gone to a lot of effort to set up the necessary switching, translation and coordination links. That's no small thing.

(Several friendly fire incidents were reported back in July. In retrospect, I'm wondering how many of those were shakedown tests.)

Also, while they couldn't have done it without NATO, let's give some props to the rebels themselves. They've clearly made a major leap forward in organization and effectiveness.

Doug M.

[Will Baird]

Looks like barring a catastrophe, August is the end game and Scuds are absolutely irrelevant.