No-drive zone and the Libyan civil war

 This is going to be ugly, but ground troops will not be needed. (With a caveat.) We can conduct enough sorties to impose a real no-drive zone between rebel-held territories and the west. The problem is that it looks as though Gaddafi’s forces have already moved into Benghazi. The rebels will have to root them out, and that could be ugly. (Preliminary reports look pretty ugly, but maybe not as much as it could have been.)

Minimally-trained infantry should be able to outflank government forces outside the cities, but the rebels seem to be worse than minimally-trained. Maybe this is my own experience talking, but they seem like mobs with guns, rather than a serious fighting force. The West could send in advisors, which would, of course, be serious mission creep. If it happens, I’d bet on the British doing it, not the United States.

The truth is, neither side the Libyan civil war appears to be particularly competent. (This should not be surprising.) In the words of a former RAF officer (and personal friend): “I think holding onto small cities was a mistake, the rebels have bogged themselves down there and waited for the fight to come. Ideally, defence should have been based on the ‘restricted block methodology’ (ie: Stalingrad) freeing up manpower to build SUV mobile platoons heading for Tripoli and locking the government in. Not rocket science, infantry 101 which concerns me about the skills of the regular Libyan NCO/Officers.” This graduate of Fort Benning, for what little that is worth (and truly, it is not worth much at all; the only times I have been in a combat zone have been as a civilian) concurs. Andrew Exum also concurs. (Oh man did his post bring back memories of digging. And getting tear-gassed. But I digress.) 

Historically, Libyan troops have performed very poorly at the operational and tactical level. From Arabs at War: “Junior officers exhibited little initiative, creativity, flexibility, or adaptability ... They rarely thought to manuever in battle, could not make combined-arms operations work properly, and regularly failed to scout or adequately secure their positions ... Information did not flow evenly across the Libyan hierarchy either verically or horizontally, with the result that few had the requisite information to adequately perform their assigned missions.” Strangely, maintenance was a serious problem, while logistics performed amazingly: the country maintained an armored division in Chad, a thousand miles away.

In this war, the logistical advantage is gone: the U.N. forces are going to make sure of that. In the east, you are going to have ugly ugly irregular fighting until the last of the Gaddafi forces are gone. In the west, though, it depends.

One smart policy would be to promise financial rewards to defecting Libyan forces, including foreign-born militia. With economic sanctions on, Gaddafi is down to paying to his troops from his cash reserves. He can’t export oil or gas, he can’t access his foreign assets. Libya is also an importer of gasoline (this is not unusual for oil producing countries). The rebels knew this, and hijacked vessels headed to Gaddafi-held territory, but now NATO navies are enforcing a blockade. Moreover, the Ras Lanouf refinery is damaged and on fire.

Another smart policy would be to call off the International Criminal Court and offer a blanket amnesty. I am sure that Venezuela would be happy to take the Colonel. (Once upon a time, I would have thought Saudi Arabia, and that might still be a possibility, even with the recent collapse in U.S.-Saudi relations.)

In short, the U.N. coalition is going to dismantle Gaddafi’s air defenses and enforce a no-drive zone. The rebels will root out government forces in the east in awful fighting to which the press will probably not pay much attention. Then we are going to get a waiting game. Even with sanctions, Gaddafi can hold out for a long time, especially if his troops think that the alternative is death. Thus, bribes ... but somehow I do not think that is going to happen. In short, we could have a long waiting game, unless

The wild card would be Gaddafi attacks on civilian populations in the west. If that happens, all bets are off. Perversely, that means a rebellion in the areas he currently holds would be worse for the U.N.’s ability to stay out than a long stalemate.

But here’s the good thing: the United States is not in the lead. Yes, we are providing right now most of the firepower. But politically, we are not in the lead. If this turns into a repeat of the containment of Iraq, the onus is not on us, and the decisions are not on us. If we draw back, the Europeans (honestly, the Anglo-French coalition) and the Arab countries will have to decide whether to keep on.

And you know what? As a nationalist American, I like that. I like being the biggest kid but not the alpha dog. The French moved out in front, the Arabs made the call, the U.N. granted the authorization, and we’re in it because we’re big and burly and feel solidarity. (Nobody reading this will understand this save for the few who went to grade school with me: we’re Jimmy, not Brandon.) And this, this is new, and this is good.

Comments

[Jonathan Edelstein]

Minimally-trained infantry should be able to outflank government forces outside the cities, but the rebels seem to be worse than minimally-trained.

Keep in mind that there are two rebel forces -- the shabab, and the regulars who defected to the revolution. The shabab were the ones who got impatient and ran into the big guns in front of Sirte. The regulars concentrated on fortifying the eastern towns. Any city defended by actual military troops -- Misrata and Ajdabiya, for instance -- has been a meatgrinder for Gaddafi's forces, and Benghazi would/will be more so.

The main problem is that the rebels don't have anything that can get around Sirte, much less defeat the regime forces that are forted up in Tripoli, and a NFZ won't help with either. I'm guessing things will return to a tactical stalemate unless something changes.

[Doug M.]

Also keep in mind that Libya is a nation-state overlaid upon a complex of web of ethnic, regional and tribal identities -- which Qaddafi has been very good at manipulating, over the years.

Qaddafi's own tribe is the Qaddafa, who IIUC are thinly but broadly spread all the way from Tunisia to Egypt. Although some Qaddafis supported at least one coup against /the/ Qaddafi, this seems to have been an internal family squabble; it looks like they've swung pretty solidly behind him now, if only for fear of what will happen if he falls.

Libya's military has lost a lot of battles, it's true -- most notably to Nyerere's Tanzania back in 1979. (Which, believe you me, the Tanzanians still remember. It's not every day that an African army rolls over an opposing force in a classic field battle.) But if Libyans are the only ones on the ground, then it doesn't matter who's bad, only who's worse.

Doug M.

[Noel Maurer]

Jonathan: good point! That said, the reports from the battles I read showed an astounding level of disorganization; quite literally, nobody seemed to be giving orders at all. Where do you get your information about the performance of rebel military units?

Doug: tribal fighting is another way that the civil war could get very ugly very fast. Intervention has prevented a massacre; as you say, the jury’s out as to whether it’s prevented all massacres.

I sort of agree with your second point, except that with no air support and with their sustainment under fire from the air, it’s hard to see how Gaddafi’s forces keep fighting in the east. Which is, of course, a different thing from the end of all fighting in the east. Or am I missing your point?

[Doug M.]

ISTM, at this date, that there's two most plausible outcomes.

One is, Qaddafi goes down pretty quickly, because his support is fairly shallow and his followers will realize this is a no-win situation. This could play out in various ways -- sudden collapse, internal coup. Obviously this is what the administration is hoping for.

T'other is, protracted civil war. The rebels have very limited offensive capability. Qaddafi had more, but now it will be sharply restricted by allied air strikes. So, a resolution by conventional war becomes difficult. Both sides consolidate along regional and tribal lines, and weeks turn into months. That gets diplomatically and militarily complicated pretty fast.

Doug M.

[Peter]

Many of Qaddafi's fighters are not Libyans, who understandably might be reluctant to fire on their countrymen, but hired mercenaries from various African countries. They're probably not being paid enough to deal with Western air and missile strikes. If they start resigning (deserting?) en masse, the regime change may come about sooner rather than later.