The U.S. really doesn't give a whole lot of aid to Honduras. Look at the figures, including military aid, from the USAID Greenbook:
That isn't a whole lot of leverage. Of course, small amounts of aid may make it more likely that they'll be yanked, since such yanking won't wreck the national economy. But that is the problem with using aid as an instrument of empire. Contingent bribes — e.g., do good and we will give you more money — are fairly easy to administer. Contingent threats — do what we want or the cookie jar will be taken away — are a lot harder. You need to be giving enough money for the recipient to care, but not so much that withdrawing it would cause drastic adjustments that would reverberate back upon the donor.
To put the above figures in perspective, remittances from the U.S. averaged 16% of GDP over the same period, peaking at 21% in 2006.
In short, the U.S. didn't have a whole lot of leverage to keep the military-Court combo from ousting President Zelaya, even if the Obama Administration had wanted to.
(Say, should I add a “Honduras” tag to the blog?)
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