The Power and the Money

More Doug in Senegal, and why you shouldn’t worry about the deficit

  It seems as though I start a lot of posts with the words “it seems.”  I will try to rectify this in the future. 

Ditto, “so,” a verbal tic I blame on my unbridled admiration for Doug Muir, who has, by the way, written a little more about Senegal.  He tells us about the Mourides, a powerful Muslim sect of which I am embarrassed to say I knew nothing.  He bemoans the crappy state of Dakar’s airport, and receives in turn a useful warning from Bernard.  Finally, he wraps his trip with a discussion of W, railroads, France, birds, the CFA franc (e.g., France yet again, although he doesn’t say so), the weather, the expats, and the clothes.  I am pretending not to be annoyed at not getting a shout-out on the France tip, which means that pique is not the reason why I am not explaining the story of the Senegalese railroads under French colonial rule. 

Which brings us to the U.S. federal deficit.  You hear a lot of worring about how interest rates are going to rise from all this wild borrowing.  Where will the money come from?  We are doomed, doomed!!  No links, because I actually like and respect many of the people doing the worrying.  But they need not.

I just had a colleague in my office with the latest BEA numbers, worrying about just that.   Where will the money come from?  So I pulled out a spreadsheet and showed him.  In the first quarter of 2009, annualized personal savings came to $620 billion, or 5.7% of personal income.  Total savings (again, annualized) came to $1,273 billion, or 9.1% of GDP. 

Personal savings is only going up.  If we assume that nominal GDP growth is flat in 2010 (meaning, most likely, that real GDP keeps falling), a rise in the personal savings rate to 10% will produce $468 billion of additional savings.  Retained earning are also likely to rise, say from 4.6% to 5.0% of GDP.  That’s another $47 billion.  Total of $515 billion in new savings ... just as the federal deficit is projected to fall by $393 billion.  Plenty of wiggle room should private investment rise (one can hope) or the current account deficit fall (which seems likely).  A rise in real interest rates does not seem like something we need to worry about.

Rather, what we need to worry about is a continuing shortfall in demand.  What if Americans don’t substitute domestic consumption for imports?  Final demand will fall.  What if domestic investment doesn’t quickly rebound?  (It was $2 trillion in 2008, a full 25% higher than in the beginning of 2009.)  Final demand will fall.  In that situation, we might be wishing for another round of stimulus, rather than worrying about the deficit. 

UPDATE:  The May numbers just came out from the BEA.  Looks like the personal savings rate hit 6.9% that month.  We are on track to exceed 10 percent in 2009, and in my opinion the country will permanently return to 1970s savings levels.  That said, past performance does not always predict future results.  Any counterarguments?

Doug in Senegal part 5

  Doug is now in Goree, a small island off the Senegalese coast.  I don't have much to add at the moment, unfortunately.  (Or not.)

Doug in Senegal parts 3 and 4

  My friend Doug Muir is in Senegal.  He is visiting a city that I am deeply ashamed to admit that I had never heard of.  His reports from Kaolack are here and here.

Read the posts.  They pose an interesting question, about infrastructure, trade, and prosperity.  How much would an improvement to Kaolack's port reduce transport costs?  How much would a reduction in transport costs increase peanut production?  (In other terms, are there increasing returns in peanut production?)  These are unanswered questions; it isn't a sure thing that fixing Kaolack will promote growth.  After all, a declining peanut economy could provoked the city's decline, rather than the other way around. 

Which isn't to say that Doug is wrong; he probably isn't.  Just that any and all development quick-fixes deserve careful stress-testing before they are implemented. 

Hopefully we'll hear more from him soon.

Domingo flojo, and Doug in Senegal parts 1 and 2

  ¡Domingo flojo!  Despierta tarde en el mediodía, llama al tren, pa’ver q pasaría ... Narnia?  No no no no no. 

So I line up a trip to the deep-pit copper mine.  Chido!  At which it point it starts to hail around here, and the company cancels.  (Liability issues.  Chile is not Mexico, it seems.)  So I figure, hey, Chile has restarted passenger train service, why not chill in Chillán?  Metro to the train station, thin attractive woman a little older than me and wearing this cute little neo-hippy snoopy hat sells me a ticket with just the right amount small talk to remind me why I like this country so much.  Only ... she realizes that the return trips are all sold out.  I debate taking the bus back, decide no, and now regret it.  WTF am I going to do in Santiago on a rainy lazy Sunday?  Work in my hotel room?  Too depressing! 

I'll figure something out.  Meanwhile, Doug Muir is in Senegal, with details here and here.  I, of course, am fascinated by the French influence.  As always, don't expect pictures from Mr. Muir, but do expect lots of information, historical detail, and very good analysis about what it all means. 

You can also go here and here on this blog, where we discuss another part of the French not-empire in West Africa, or here, where you find out how Burundi got a handle on infectious disease.

I'll be back with more about regional inequality, copper, and the effect of the Panama Canal on Chile, but right now I'm going to go brave the rain and wander aimlessly around Santiago for a while.  I will, however, take requests for any Chile-related topics you might want to know more about.  (Randy has one pending on regional inequality.)  Hasta pronto, mis cuates desconocidos. 

The great socialist scramble for Africa

  So, China is trying to get into the Nigerien uranium business, for reasons known only to the China National Uranium Corporation.  (Although I will guess later in this post.)  Here's the story to date.  On June 5, 2007, the Nigerien government formed the Société des Mines d'Azelik (Somina) a mining enterprise intended to exploit the Azelik uranium deposit way up in the north.  Niger got a 33% stake in the enterprise, with China getting 67%.   On July 6, Toureg rebels kidnapped a Chinese national for four days.  On November 9, Somina got an official license to work at Azelik.  On November 11, the Toureg rebels declared that China's contracts were "invalid."  At which point the Nigeriens accused Areva (the French state-owned nuclear company) once again of funding the rebels.  The same rebels, that is, who attacked Areva in April.

So the Chinese suspended work.  And the Nigerien government started to hem and haw and stall and delay.  So much for all those Chinese plants to build 50 MW of (conventional) power plants in the country and a €27.3 million bridge over the Niger river.  On the other hand, the Chinese didn't want to lose their options, so on April 30, 2009, they agreed to lend the Nigerien government $95.22 million at 2% over ten years, with the loan explicitly (but vaguely) tied to the stalled Azelik project.  China, meanwhile, sold 5 percentage points of its interest in the mine to a state-owned Korean company, which promised the Nigerien government that it would buy 400 tons per year once (if) the 700 tons-per-year mine gets up and running.  The president of Niger has just visited the site, in order to show his seriousness about getting the project back on track. 

The hitch is that as the Chinese project in Azelik stalled, France was on the move. In January 2009, Areva signed a deal to open the largest uranium mine on the continent, and President Sarkozy visited Niger in March to give it his full-throated support.  That's a problem for the Chinese.

Now, the Chinese still have a good project if they can get it running.  After all, they have gotten the Korean government to implicitly promise to buy the uranium at whatever price the Chinese charge, which will be quite a coup if the mine opens.  Not a terribly bad plan.  That said, the overall impression is that the Chinese really don't yet know how to play this game.  

So what exactly is the game?  Suggestion below the fold.

On the edge of the French energy empire

  In 1965, the French discovered uranium in Niger.  Here is what the New York Times had to say about it in 1969, right before production began.  It makes for fascinating reading.  

The paved road comes to an end in this isolated, dust-colored market town on the southern shore of the sand sea known as the Sahara.  About 300 miles farther north, along an ill-defined track, lies the town of Agadez.  About 150 miles beyond that, near the jumbled boulders of the Air Mountains, the village of Arlit is rising.  Where nothing more than tumbledown mud huts stood two years ago, French and African workmen are building cement-block houses, shops, an electrical generating plant big enough for a city of 40,000 — and two uranium processing plants. 

The uranium will be produced by a company in which the government of Niger holds 20 percent, German groups 10 percent, and the French Atomic Energy Commission and two French mining companies 70 percent ...

In a country where the per capita income runs about $75 a year ($351 in 2008 dollars), peanuts and bony steers constitute the only significant exports, where fuel is so scarce that technicians once tried and failed to make a power plant run on peanut husks, the discovery of uranium was an extraordinary event.

Niger will receive about 40 percent of the company’s profits ... Niger is counting on only $4 million a year in revenues by 1975 — about a tenth of the current national budget.  “Even with this strike,” said a local economist this week, “this is never going to be a rich country—unless they find a market for sand.” 

Imperialism can pay ... the imperialized

  The French empire in Africa never really ended.  In 1960, the autonomous territories of the “French Community” got seats in the United Nations, but for most the change was less than dramatic.  Only Mali dropped the use of the old colonial currency.  The new African governments increased trade restrictions, bit by bit, and the French market closed to their exports, bit by bit, but Paris fought hard to keep the European market open for a very long time.  The Yaoundé and Lomé conventions granted the “associated” states preferential access to what later became the E.U. 

Empire didn’t go away in another more visible manner:   French troops remained on the continent, French nationals staffed the governments and newly-created armies, French companies (often state-owned) dominated the export industries, and France knocked over more than a few recalcitrant governments while propping up others. 

Niger, where the French found uranium, made for a particularly egregious example.  In 1963, French troops rescued the government of President Hamani Diori from a coup.  In 1969, the French discovered uranium, and two French companies got exclusive rights.  In March 1974, French, Nigerien, and Gabonese representatives meant in Niger’s capital to discuss Diori’s insistance that the country’s uranium contracts be renegotiated.  Coincidentally, Diori fell to a coup the next month.  It seems that all of Diori’s French military advisors had gone on vacation and no one picked up the phone in Paris when news of the violence arrived.  The New York Times went so far as to accuse France of abetting the coup because Diori wanted to give uranium concessions to Exxon.  The next guy kicked French troops out of the country, but the French remained in control of the mines ... and their troops came back in 1981 anyway.

So what did the combination of continuing French intervention and French uranium mining mean for Niger?  An unexpected answer below the fold. 

Canadian policy on captured pirates: let ‘em go. ¿¿De veras??

  As our few readers know, we've been covering piracy for some time on this blog.  Our first post on the topic, in fact, took on the myth that European navies refused to enforce the law against pirates.  Only now Robert Farley tells us that the Canadian and Dutch navies went ahead, captured pirates, and released them.  Er?

Well, NATO is not the problem.  It is true that NATO, which is not a sovereign state, does not have arrest powers.  But the national navies operating under NATO command do have such powers.  Now, I'd be happy with giving an international organization arrest powers, but I can see why some politicians might be reluctant to take that step.  That said, the truth is that not only do national militaries have the power to arrest pirates on the high seas, since December they've had the ability to do the same thing anywhere in Somali territory, sea or land.

So if this and this story are correct, something isn't working.  In the Dutch case, it seems to have been a low-level screw-up.  Ships under European command have standing orders to turn captured pirates over to Kenya for prosecution and punishment; ships under NATO do not.  There was a deputy from the justice ministry on board the Dutch ship (for precisely this reason), but whoever it was decided to let the pirates go.  Parliament appears to be annoyed.  At some point, I suppose, we'll find out who made the decision and why.  We might even find that circumstances made it a wise choice.  But it isn't Dutch policy, and it seems to be causing the government some headaches at home.

Canada seems to have a deeper problem.  The Globe and Mail has deeply misinformed its readers by reporting, contrary to fact, that “Canadian sailors, like their NATO allies, lack the authority to make arrests in international waters.”  Of course, the Globe and Mail is parroting what seems to be Ottawa's official line.  After all, the Prime Minister said in Port-of-Spain that the Winnipeg did the right thing by releasing the pirates.  “Those were the appropriate measures under the circumstances.”  Elsewhere, a Canadian admiral alluded to mysterious legal difficulties.  “There's the rule of law that needs to be applied, so we're not currently regularly detaining them, no. There are all kinds of challenges with that.” 

Now, I can understand why a country would fear becoming a dumping ground for pirates ... but it isn't as though hundreds or thousands of them are being captured every year.  Nor is organizing a piracy trial under normal criminal rules all that difficult.  (And they have, by definition, been caught red-handed.) 

So, Canadian readers, I ask you, what the hell?

Pirates and convoys

  I clearly need a new tag.  What should it be?  “Pirates” is too specific for my taste.  “Failed states” is a possibility, but seems a bit, well, anodyne given the rather horrible reality of just what happens when a state fails in the modern world.  “Empire” is another, but might be too ... whatever the opposite of anodyne is.  I'm looking for a short pithy one or two-word phrase that covers places and situations in which the writ of the local state does not apply (or at the very least is not the sole source of authority) and in which other states or institutions might have to substitute for the local government.  Ideas?  Reasons to pick either “failed states” or “empire”?  C'mon, help me out. 

Returning to the topic of the day, in theory there is a way to make policing the sea lanes leading to the Suez Canal much easier.  For reasons which I do not yet fully understand (help?) the Suez Canal authority organizes transits in three daily convoys.  The implication is that, in theory, such convoys could be organized not at the Canal entrance, but at some point in the Indian Ocean.  Naval vessels could then shadow the three daily convoys.  This would require far fewer ships than the impossible 180-vessel armada. 

The organizational details, however, seem rather daunting.  Still, it might be possible for an enterprising contractor to organize convoys around their protective vessels.  It would be more expensive than simply hiring out a security vessel, because the convoys would need to be managed, but it would allow the security firm to enjoy economies of scale from the point of view of the companies that hired its services:  the more clients, the less cost-per-client. 

Thoughts?

More thoughts about pirates

  Pirates attacked 11 vessels in the Gulf of Aden in November.  They attacked an additional 6 in the Indian Ocean off the Somali coast.  Of the 11 incidents in the Gulf, all occurred right outside Yemenese territorial waters, which passing ships have taken to hugging as they head to and from Suez.  Of the 11 attacks in the Gulf, the pirates took their targets six times.  NATO warships stopped three and a tanker crew managed to avoid the tenth.  Of the attacks in the Indian ocean, the Indian navystopped one (sinking the pirate vessel involved), the crews involved evaded three (two by outrunning the pirates and one by turning firehoses on them as they tried to board, knocking their shoulder-held RPGs into the water), and two took their targets. 

I can't link to the source; it's what I was told by intel officers in the U.S. Coast Guard.  Don't worry, it's unclassified.  Another good data source is here, and a third here.

So what is the scale of the problem?  Well, in 2006 roughly 51 vessels passed through the Suez Canal each day.  Given the length of the Gulf of Aden, the fact that the pirates seem to be able to range about 450 miles beyond that, and an average ship speed of 22 knots, that would mean approximately 90 ships within pirate range every day.  (This assumes that vessels headed around Cape Horn could fairly easily re-route to remain out of pirate range.) 

The implication is that a rotating flotilla of 180 armed vessels could probably deal with the problem.  Djibouti may no longer be a French territory, but it hosts several thousand French troops and at least 450 American ones at Camp Lemonier, and it has a (relatively) modern port.  In other words, it isn't right to think that stabilizing Somalia is the only solution.  Of course, the pirates use swarming tactics, where they attack with multiple boats, which poses a very serious tactical problem for the escort vessels.  (Under the current rules of engagement, there is maybe a 15-minute window to attack a pirate ship.)  Alternate strategies are possible; the real point is that the problem is manageable even without any attempt to stabilize Somalia or, alternatively, a smash-up of the pirates' coastal havens.  (The human cost of the latter would not be low.)  One could imagine alternative operations involving continuous aerial patrols of the effected areas, although speaking as someone with some experience, managing such a thing would not be easy and the chance of a major cock-up would be high. 

The big problem?  See below.

Imperialism can really pay

So there's Panama.  Well, what about Suez?

The Suez Canal started under very different political conditions, inasmuch as the Egyptian government was on-board with the project.  So on board, in fact, that it not only put in 45 percent of the initial capital (£1.5 million), it promised the Compagnie de Suez the free use of forced labor to build the thing. 

That wasn't nada.  In 2007 pound sterling, the Egyptians put in £149 million.  But as I've mentioned elsewhere, the world was poorer then:  relative to the growth of the British economy since then, that would be equivalent of plonking in £4.3 billion today.  That would be a lot of scratch for the current Egyptian government; it was an amazing amount of scratch for 1854's. 

So far, so non-imperialistic.  Awful for the poor people who had to live under Cairo's despotism, but that'd be like blaming Russia for the shortcomings of the Kazakh government.  (Wait ... no, I'll leave that to those who know more.)

The story gets better, though.  It's an amazing bit of imperial skullduggery ... and perhaps the coolest thing about it is that it could easily happen today.  I mean, it's not like world powers scarf off strategic parts of nearby states for strategic gain these days.

So, with the caveat that what I'm about to tell you is pieced together from primary sources and could well be wrong, the story is below.

Doug leaves Burundi

Doug should be back in Germany by now.  He spent his last day in Burundi by the shores of Lake Tanganyika, thinking about tourist potential and the mind-boggling idiocy of the Belgian empire.

I wish him an easy trip home and a wonderful time with his growing family.

Doug in Burundi, Part 9

Doug discusses three separate Burundian issues in his penultimate post in the Burundian series.  The first topic concerns the country's ethnic divide.  It's pervasive, but considering recent history the story is remarkably positive. 

The second topic concerns customs duties.  Burundi, like many African countries (and a few Central American ones) relies heavily on trade taxes for a quarter of its government revenues.  This is the unheralded elephant in the room during free trade discussions.  These countries have a pressing need for more public revenue, to build infrastructure and pay judges and carry out very basic state functions.  Yet they lack the administrative capacity to collect high levels of internal taxes.  Borrowing to build a state could square that circle, in theory; in practice, that hasn't worked out so well.  So what to do?

One possibility is to make like Angola or Mozambique, both of which have effectively handed control over their customs administration to foreigners.  (British foreigners, at that.  Crown Agents, whose flag is pictured above, specializes in running revenue collection in other countries.) 

That sort of empire-by-invitation doesn't seem to be on the table in Burundi, however, although one might think that the French government might be able to play a more pro-active role, if it wanted to.

The third and final topic concerns an issue I find fascinating:  how do banks function in an environment where the politics is unstable and the rule-of-law close to nonexistant?  I wrote my first book about that, and it's fascinating to watch a Togolese (or is it Nigerian?) bank and Burundian politicos deal with the same issues today.  Ecobank is an institution that bears further watching.   

Doug in Burundi, part 8

Here Doug discusses what cheap labor really means on the ground.  And he means cheap labor.  According to the U.S. State Department, workers in Burundi received on average 1,500 francs per day, or $1.40.  Since a 12-hour day wouldn't surprise me, Doug's estimate of 20 cents per hour might even be high.

You don't need to go to Western Europe to see just how poor that is.  To give an example with which Americans are familiar, production workers in Mexican maquiladoras cost US$2.64 per hour in 2006.  Production workers in all Mexican manufacturing cost US$2.75.  Total hourly direct pay for all employees (including benefits but not taxes and other social charges) averaged US$3.32 per hour.  (That'd be 5,752 pesos per month.)  Even farmworkers in the country's northern states make about US$1.50 an hour.  In short, Burundi is impoverished compared to Mexico.

Anyone who spends time in Latin America can see some of the effects of cheap labor, but nothing on the scale of what Doug describes.

Doug in Burundi, part 7, time for some coffee

Doug discusses the Burundian coffee economy here. 

A decade ago (or thereabouts) I got involved with an NGO that advised Chiapan villagers in the area off Mexico-199 between Paleque and Ocosingo. To get there, you had to leave the paved road, travelling along dirt paths maintained (and unofficially tolled) by the locals.  The agricultural areas were served by little "towns" barely worthy of the name, usually consisting of a church (often Protestant — there had been a great deal of religious fighting in the area, and towns tended to be segregated) and a general store.  Electricity was scarce, although cellphones worked fine in some surprising places — the Mexican army made sure of that.

The chief cash crops were cacao and coffee.  More below the fold.

Doug in Burundi, part 6, with hope and vaccines

Vaccination has made an astounding improvement in Burundian public health, even in the midst of civil war.  The question is how Burundi vaccinated so many in the midst of so much instability.  Below is a graph of disease incidence, indexed so that the number of cases in 1980 is set equal to 100.

There is some sad information in the data:  most of the improvement occurs before the outbreak of civil war in 1993.  (The Buyoya regime killed its opponents with impunity, but the state still functioned.  Mostly.)  Then there are disease outbreaks until 1997, which happens to be around the time the fighting started to trail off, right before the '98 peace agreement.  After that, disease resumes its downward trend, save for an outbreak of measles in 2000.

Burundi has not been peaceful since 1998, but nor has it been the scene of full-fledged civil war.  The state functioned.  In 2002, the vaccination program went into high gear, with many rebels even agreeing to respect the “Days of Tranquility,” during which the government set up 990 different vaccination sites around the country.    Here is a brief discussion of the logistics of vaccination campaigns in Africa.  Things were slightly easier in Burundi, where 77 percent of the population had access to health services in 2002 and foreign aid workers operated relatively freely. 

None of this is to minimize the accomplishments of the Burundian public officials who travelled off into the hinterlands to vaccinate the population.  It is simply to say that Burundi is not the worst of the worst in Africa, and the civil war was a terrible setback in a place where public health had been improving.  Backsliding is still a real worry.  Chronology here.

Doug, I would very much like to know more about the role of foreign officials in managing Burundian affairs.  There are countries (like Liberia and Afghanistan) where you can't turn around without encountering a foreign manager or a foreign agency carrying out state functions.  That happens even in Angola and Mozambique.  Elsewhere, foreigners are advisers, facilitators, and funders, but not managers.  What's the situation in Burundi?

Doug in Burundi, part 5

More about Burundi, starting with the presence of the African Union, moving on to the rebels, and ending with a discussion of the country's really really bad transport problems.  It appears to still be raining in Bujumbura.

One point that I'll repeat on Doug's comment page:  narrow gauge isn't a problem.  Narrow gauge railroads can be upgraded to carry similar loads and operate at close-to similar speeds as standard gauge.  They simply lose most of their initial cost advantage.

Doug in Burundi, parts 3 and 4

Looks like it's rainy in Bujumbura.  It's been weirdly tropical in Massachusetts this summer:  black downpours so heavy that you can't see across the street followed by bright actinic sunshine.  Thankfully, that seems to have ended here; let's hope it ends soon in Burundi.

Over here, Doug explains why there's a Greek deli in the middle of Bujunbura.  It seems as though there was a small community that came down the Nile from Alexandria with the British; some kept going and wound up in Burundi, where they helped administer the place and played a role in commerce.  The messiness of independence, though, drove most of them back to Europe (I assume), leaving a big consulate and what seems to be a very nice deli.

Doug in Burundi, part 2

Catch it here.  Although I dunno why it's on AFOE instead of HDTD.

Doug in Burundi, part 1

Available here.

Piratas atacan la madre patria

Newsflash:   pirates just captured a Spanish fishing boat off the coast of Somalia.  A Spanish frigate has been dispatched from the Red Sea and Madrid has requested assistance from NATO countries with a naval presence in the area. 

Considering as I just posted about pirates, I figured that it'd be remiss not to mention that the French raid doesn't seem to had an immediate deterrent effect.  Not that there's anything surprising about that.

Pirates!

In a scene of most superior uber-cool, the French military arrested the Somali pirates who’d captured a cruise vessel returning from the Seychelles on April 4th. 

So, of course, the New York Times would take the opportunity to publish an op-ed blaming namby-pamby British cupcakes for failing to enforce international law by arresting Somali pirates.  Why did the author claim that the Brits were wussing out? Because they were all worried that these scurrilous lawbreakers might claim asylum if they were brought back to the U.K.  Worse yet, the Somali government might violate their human rights if they were turned over to Mogadishu.   

“The British attitude has come a long way since the days when pirates were chained to pilings at Wapping and left there until the tidal water of the Thames ebbed and flowed over the bodies three times. So much for Britannia ruling the waves.”

Sounds good, right?  Fits a whole narrative of European decline, although, well, the part about French military prowess doesn’t quite fit.   

Too bad it’s all complete crapola.  Details below the fold.