Syrian September

Four days ago, I wrote this:

Foreign military intervention is (for reasons I’ve discussed) unlikely, though not out of the question; watch for Turkish agitation to create a “safe haven” in northern Syria or rebel attacks on Syrian Air Force bases and other assets. (That Turkish plane that got shot down a few weeks ago? Very probably a probe of Syria’s air defenses. As long as those are still working, military intervention will be hard and expensive. So if the rebels suddenly start going after bases and air defense batteries, then that’ll be suggestive.)

This morning comes the news that Syrian rebels have attacked and looted an air defense base in Eastern Syria. In fact, it looks like this may be part of a sudden shift towards attacking air defense facilities; there was another, separate attack on an airbase yesterday, and one last week that went unnoticed until now.

Now, there are other reasons for the rebels to be attacking airbases. The Air Force is widely and particularly hated — traditionally because it’s long been a stronghold of Alawite influence, more recently because of indiscriminate bombings of civilian neighborhoods. And air defense bases have surface-to-air missiles, which the rebels will be delighted to get their hands on. But multiple attacks on bases and air defense sites in a few days? Yeah, that looks a lot like someone has been whispering in the rebels’ ears.How this plays out... well, I doubt the rebels can severely damage Syria’s air defense capability. But they can definitely degrade it. A lesson going back for decades, to Algeria and Vietnam, is that it’s damnably hard to maintain air bases in the midst of a hostile countryside. (I’m writing this post in Belgrade, Serbia. Belgrade has a fascinating Air Museum out at the airport. It includes half a dozen German and Italian aircraft, captured during WWII when the Yugoslav Partisans launched surprise attacks on Axis airbases in occupied Yugoslavia. The Partisans didn’t capture that many aircraft, of course — most, they just blew up.) It’s not impossible, by any means — that’s another lesson from Vietnam — but the regime will have to allocate money (in short supply) and loyal soldiers (in dangerously short supply) to garrisoning its air bases. Over time, it will probably have to consolidate its air defenses in fewer sites and bases, making it strategically more vulnerable. So, definitely an ominous development.

Now, since this is the Middle East, it’s also possible that there’s a second game. The attacks on airbases may be a signal that someone — the Turks, the West — is getting serious about intervention. A signal to who, though? The regime is probably past caring. The Russians?

Comments

[Peter]

Merely asking this question may sound like something a JFK-is-alive-as-a-vegetable conspiracy nut would do, but ... could Israel be orchestrating the attacks on the Syrian air bases? If the Israelis decide to attack the Iranian nuclear research facilities it would be quite useful if their aircraft could overfly Syria in relative safety. Overflying Jordan also would work, but the Israelis might want to preserve what's left of their semi-tolerable relationship with the Jordanians.

[Doug M.]

Peter, it's the Middle East, so no theory is too twisted. But I wouldn't consider it likely.

For one thing, I'm not completely convinced that "the Israelis" -- here meaning the inner circles of the Netanyahu government -- actually do want to bomb Iran. Talk about bombing Iran, threaten to bomb Iran, work themselves and the public into a lather about the menace of Iran? sure. But actually go ahead and try to bomb Iran? Yeah, not so certain about that.

They've been yelling about it for six years now without actually doing a single thing, you know? That's not how the Israelis act when they really, truly want to bomb something. (See, e.g., Nasser's air force in 1967, or the Osirak strike, or Operation Orchard a few years back. They never said a word about any of those in advance. Just, whoosh, kaboom.) To me, this is starting to look more like a piece of political kabuki meant for Israeli domestic consumption: Oh, we WANT to bomb Iran SO BAD, but those wimpy Americans -- currently led by a guy who doesn't love Israel, you know -- won't let us.

But anyway. A much stronger reason to doubt Israeli involvement is that Israel probably has very little direct influence on what's happening in Syria right now. That's because anti-Israel sentiment is universal in Syria. So while there are a dozen or more different rebel groups, they're all anti-Israel to one degree or another. Israel surely has intelligence assets in Syria, but I doubt there's any significant rebel group that would accept Israeli help or advice.

There was a time when Israel would have been able to influence the rebels anyway, using the Turks, but I'm not sure if the current state of Israeli-Turkish relations would support that.

Final thought: if the Israelis really believed that the Iranians were about to deploy an existential threat to Israel, offending the Jordanians would probably not be a major issue for them.

Doug M.

[Doug M.]

Three weeks later, it's reaching the New York Times:

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/27/world/middleeast/rebels-make-gains-in-blunting-syrian-air-attacks.html?pagewanted=1

-- although it's a rather skimpy article, and doesn't address the question of whether the fight for the base is part of a larger pattern.

On a slight tangent: the Russians worked some real mischief with those shore-to-sea antiship missiles. Notice all the discussion of naval options against Syria? Nope, me neither. Complete and utter silence. There won't be any blockade of the Syrian coast until those things are taken off the board somehow.

It was a very clever move. Whether it was also a smart one... well, it's still not clear to me what real strategic interest the Russians have in propping up Assad.

Doug M.